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Abstract
Computational Social Choice (ComSoc) is a rapidly developing field at the intersec-
tion of computer science, economics, social choice, and political science. The study of
tournaments is fundamental to ComSoc and many results have been published about
tournament solution sets and reasoning in tournaments [4]. Theoretical results in Com-
Soc tend to be worst case and tell us little about performance in practice. To this end we
detail some experiments on tournaments [24] using real wold data from soccer and ten-
nis. We make three main contributions to the understanding of tournaments using real
world data from English Premier League, the German Bundesliga, and the ATP World
Tour: (1) we find that the NP-hard question of finding a seeding for which a given
team can win a tournament is easily solvable in real world instances, (2) using detailed
and principled methodology from statistical physics we show that our real world data
obeys a log-normal distribution; and (3) leveraging our log-normal distribution result
and using robust statistical methods, we show that the popular Condorcet Random (CR)
tournament model does not generate realistic tournament data.
Keywords: Tournaments, Computational Social Choice, Economics, Preferences,
Reasoning Under Uncertainty
1. Introduction
Computational Social Choice (ComSoc) has delivered impactful improvements in
several real world settings ranging from optimizing kidney exchanges [14] to devising
mechanisms which to assign students to schools and/or courses more fair and efficient
manners [5]. ComSoc has also had impact in a number of other disciplines within
computer science including recommender systems, data mining, machine learning, and
preference handling [38, 7]. From its earliest days, much theoretical work in ComSoc
has centered on worst case assumptions [3]. Indeed, in the last 10 years, there has been
a groundswell of such research which shows little signs of slowing [11, 16, 15].
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Within ComSoc, much work focuses on manipulative or strategic behavior, which
may take many different forms including manipulation and control of election and
aggregation functions [4]. Often, advanced algorithmic techniques such as fixed pa-
rameter tractability to move beyond these worst case assumptions [9, 16]. Approxi-
mation algorithms have played an important part, helping to determine the winner of
some hard to compute voting rules [6, 40]. Approximation has been used in other areas
of social choice including mechanism design, often to achieve good results when the
“worst case” is too hard [36]. Additional algorithmic work has centered on average
case complexity (which typically suppose very uniform sampling of instances) [35]
and/or attempting to understand the parameters which make an aggregation or choice
rule hard to manipulate [10, 48].
In one of the papers that founded the field, Bartholdi, III et al. [3] warned against
exclusively focusing on worst case assumptions stating, “The existence of effective
heuristics would weaken any practical import of our idea. It would be very interesting
to find such heuristics.” For the last several years we have championed the use of real
world data in ComSoc [30] and are happy to see more and more researchers working
in this area (e.g., [17, 42]).1 We see an increased focus on experimentation, heuristics,
and verifying theory and models through properly incentivized data collection and ex-
perimentation as key research direction for ComSoc. Some of the most impactful work
in ComSoc has come from the development of theory that is specifically informed by
real world data and/or practical application that is then rigorously tested (e.g., [5, 14]).
Contribution. In this short note we detail a study of tournaments [24] using real
world and generated data. We show that, despite the NP-completeness of the Tourna-
ment Fixing Problem (TFP) [2], enumerating all the seedings for which a particular
player can win is quickly solvable for a large number of generated and real world in-
stances. Additionally, we show that the popular Condorcet Random (CR) model used
to generate synthetic tournaments (i) does not match real world data and (ii) is drawing
from a fundamentally different distribution than real world tournaments. The statistical
and modeling methodologies we use for this research may be of independent interest
to empirical researchers in social choice.
2. Preliminaries: Tournaments
Whether or not teams can advance through a knockout tournament tree in order
to claim a championship is a question on the minds of many during the FIFA World
Cup, ATP Tennis Tournaments, NCAA Basketball Tournaments, and numerous soccer
leagues around the world. The scheduling of the tournament, the seeding which dictates
whom will play whom, and its manipulation in order to maximize a particular team’s
chance of winning is a well studied problem in ComSoc and other areas [19, 44, 47,
20, 22, 23].
Following Aziz et al. [2], we are given a set of players N = {1, . . . ,n} and a deter-
ministic pairwise comparisons P for all players in N. For every i, j in N, if Pi, j = 1 then
1For a more comprehensive listing with links to over 80 papers and a wealth of tools and resources, please
see www.preflib.org.
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we say that player i beats player j in a head to head competition; this means that i> j in
a pairwise comparison. In a balanced knockout tournament we have that n= 2c. Given
a set of players N, a balanced knockout tournament T (N,σ) is a balanced binary tree
with n leaf nodes and a draw σ . There are multiple isomorphic (ordered) assignments
of agents in N to the leaf nodes, we represent these as a single unordered draw σ .
Observe that there are n! assignments to leaf nodes but only n!/2n−1 draws.
A knockout tournament T (N,σ) is the selection procedure where each pair of sib-
ling leaf nodes competes against each other. The winner of this competition proceeds
up the tree into the next round; the winner of the knockout tournament is the player that
reaches the root note. In this study we want to understand the computational properties
of the TOURNAMENT FIXING PROBLEM (TFP).
TOURNAMENT FIXING PROBLEM (TFP):
Instance: A set of players N, a deterministic pairwise comparision matrix P, and a
disginuished player i ∈ N.
Question: Does there exist a draw σ for the players in N where i is the winner of
T (N,σ )?
It was recently proven that even if a manipulator knows the outcome of each pair-
wise matchup, the problem of finding a seeding for which a particular team will win
is NP-hard [2], thus concluding a long line of inquiry into this problem. More recent
results have shown that, for a number of natural model restrictions, the TFP is easily
solvable [4]. Note that the code developed for the next section can be easily generalized
to the case where we do not enforce the balanced constraint on T .
One popular model for generating P for experiment is the Condorcet Random (CR)
model, introduced by Young [49]. The model has one tuning parameter Pr(b) which
gives the probability that a lower ranked team will defeat (upset) a higher ranked team
in a head-to-head matchup. In general, 0.0 < Pr(b) < 0.5. A Uniform Random Tour-
nament has Pr(b = 0.5). The manipulation of tournament seedings has been studied
using both random models [41, 22, 23] and a mix of real data and random models [19].
A more sophisticated model of random tournaments was developed by Russell and van
Beek [39] – upset probabilities were fitted to historical data, and varied according to
the difference in the ranking of the teams (surprisingly for their tennis data, the upset
probability remained relatively invariant to the difference in player rankings).
To explore how theory lines up with practice, we looked at two questions:
1. Does the NP-completeness of knockout tournament seeding manipulations tell us
about the complexity of manipulation in practice?
2. Are random models which are popularly used in ComSoc supported by real world
data?
To answer these questions we use data from the 2009-2014 English Premier League
and German Bundesliga, along with lifetime head-to-head statistics of the top 16 tennis
players on the ATP world tour to create 16 team pairwise tournament datasets.
3. Tournament Fixing in Practice
In order to convert the datasets into deterministic pairwise tournaments we used
two different strategies. Using the lifetime head to head ATP tour results we get a set
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Rank Name Seedings Won % Total Nodes First Nodes All Time All (s)
2 Novak Djokovic (SRB) 175,188,825 27.437007% 15 367 53
3 David Ferrer (ESP) 302,736 0.047413% 11 195 5.248
4 Andy Murray (GBR) 141,180,205 22.110784% 13 658 41
5 Juan Martin Del Potro (ARG) 125,622 0.019674% 11 207 2.344
6 Roger Federer (SUI) 320,366,970 50.173925% 13 4991 1
7 Tomas Berdych (CZE) 127,115 0.019908% 12 10604 2.347
8 Stanislas Wawrinka (SUI) 629 0.000099% 6 672 0.022
9 Richard Gasquet (FRA) 1,382 0.000216% 8 197 0.032
10 Jo-Wilfried Tsonga (FRA) 2,509 0.000393% 6 76 0.064
11 Milos Raonic (CAN) 1,203,771 0.188527% 23 285 21.061
12 Tommy Haas (GER) 0 0.000000% 0 N/A N/A
13 John Isner (USA) 25 0.000004% 6 63 0.006
14 John Almagro (ESP) 0 0.000000% 0 N/A N/A
15 Mikhail Youzhny (RUS) 13,040 0.002042% 8 398 0.241
16 Fabio Fognini (ITA) 0 0.000000% 0 N/A N/A
17 Kei Nishikori (JPN) 46 0.000007% 6 119 0.008
Table 1: The number of knockout tournament seedings that a particular player in the
world top 17 could win based on head-to-head record as of Feb. 1, 2014. Players writ-
ten in bold are commonly called kings [31] which is equivalent to belonging to the
uncovered set [24].
of weighted pairwise comparisons that we can use as input to understand tournaments.
Using all data available up until Feb. 1, 2014 provides something that is not a tour-
nament graph. There are several ties and several players who have never played each
other. Given the matchup matrix, we extracted a {0,1} tournament graph by saying
one player beats another if their historical average is ≥ 50%. This does not create a
tournament graph, hence we award all ties, including if two players have never met, to
the higher ranked player. This results in Rafael Nadal being a Condorcet winner and
he is thus removed from the following analysis. For the soccer data, we deterministi-
cally assigned as the pairwise winner the team which had scored more total goals in
the home-and-away format for a particular year (ties broken by away goals).
We implemented a simple constraint program in miniZinc [33] to search for a seed-
ing that ensures a given team wins. The miniZinc model which was then solved using
a modified version of GeCode (http://www.gecode.org). The modifications to
GeCode served to make the counting of all solutions faster by removing all diagnostic
printing to STDOUT and implementing some other small caching optimizations. All
experiments were run on a system running Debian 6.0.10 with a 2.0 GHz Intel Xeon
E5405 CPU and 4 GB of RAM; GeCode was restricted to using 4 cores.
For all the tournaments in our experiments we have 16 teams which means that
the entire search space is 16!/215 = 638,512,875 possible seedings. Table 1 shows the
results for each of the players in the ATP World Top 16 including the total number of
seedings won (and percentage of the overall total number of seedings), the number of
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File Min First Median First Max First Min All Median All Max All
Bundesliga 2009 9 13.5 18 41 143 576
Bundesliga 2010 12 15 20 55 165 1,841
Bundesliga 2011 9 12.5 19 50 191 1,153,930
Bundesliga 2012 11 15.5 278 132 400 1,312
Bundesliga 2013 11 13.5 16 124 267 8,341
Bundesliga 2014 8 17 106 142 288 697
Premier 2009 12 15.5 22 126 295 80,497
Premier 2010 10 17 95 33 284 228,237
Premier 2011 9 12.5 63 110 358 2,823
Premier 2012 9 14.5 433 96 248 1,969
Premier 2013 6 9 15 62 364 3,016
Premier 2014 12 39 351 99 377 14,442
Tennis Top 16 6 8 23 63 285 10,604
Table 2: Summary of the number of choice points explored to find the first or all seed-
ings for which a team can win a knockout tournament, respectively, for all teams across
all datasets. Results from finding seedings for which any given team can win a knock-
out tournament. Nodes are the number of choice points explored to find the first or all
seedings, respectively, for all teams. Teams which could not win any seeding are not
included in these results.
choice points (nodes of the search tree) explored to find the first (resp. all) seedings,
and and time (minutes) explored to to find all seedings for which a player can win a
tournament. Table 2 gives summary statistics for the number of choice points (nodes of
the search tree) and time (minutes) explored to to find the first (resp. all) seedings for
which a team can win a knockout tournament for all teams across all 13 datasets.
Despite this being a NP-hard problem, it was extremely easy in every dataset to
find a winning seeding for any given team (or prove that none existed). Exhaustively,
counting all the winning seedings took more time but even this was achievable. Only
the Bundseliga 2011 experiment came anywhere close to exploring even a small frac-
tion of the 16!215 = 638,512,875 total possible seedings.
The practical upshot of these computational results is that real world tournaments
exhibit a lot of structure which is possible to leverage for practical computation. While
the simple techniques we employed may not scale to the 128!2127 = 2.3 ∗ 10177 possible
seedings in the 128 player Wimbledon Tournament, they can be used for more mod-
estly sized tournaments. The low number of choice points explored for these instances
may indicate that there is practically exploitable structure in larger tournaments; an
interesting avenue for future research.
4. Verifying Real World Tournament Models
We turn to a second fundamental question. The CR model has been used to derive
theoretical bounds on the complexity of manipulating the seeding in knockout tourna-
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ments [41]. But does it adequately model real world tournaments? In the soccer datasets
we take the teams goals scored over the total as the pairwise probability, while we use
the life time head-to-head average to determine probabilities in the tennis data. To test
the modeling power of CR, we generated pairwise probabilities with 0.0<Pr(b)≤ 0.5.
We then computed, for each of the real world datasets and all values of Pr(b) in steps
of 0.01, the probabilities that teams would win a knockout tournament using a simple
sampling procedure which converged to the actual probability quickly; uniformly sam-
pling over all possible seedings and updating the probability estimates for each team
for a particular seeding, the probability that every team wins the tournament can be
computed efficiently [29, 46, 45].
Our hypothesis is that the probability of winning a knockout tournament for a team
in the real world data is a random variable drawn from the same distribution as the CR
model. We approach this question in two parts. (1) Using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)
tests with p = 0.05 as our significance threshold [8], we can determine if the data is
drawn from the same type of distribution, i.e. a normal distribution or a heavy tailed
distribution such as a log-normal or power law distribution. (2) Then for a candidate
pair of samples, we determine if the fitting parameters of the distribution are similar.
The KS test compares the distance between the cumulative distribution (CDF) of
two empirical samples to determine whether or not two different samples are drawn
from the same distribution. Figure 1(A) shows the CDF of the 2014 Bundesliga league
data along with several settings of Pr(b). Table 3 gives the minimum and maximum
values of Pr(b), per dataset, for which we can say that the probability distribution of a
team winning a knockout tournament according to the CR model is likely drawn from
the same distribution as the respective real world dataset (KS test, p = 0.05). We can
reject CR models with values of Pr(b) outside these ranges; as these models are not
likely to emerge from the same distribution as the real world datasets. We also provide
average upset probability for each datafile to compare with the results of Russell and
van Beek [39].
Examining our results, we find no support for the Uniform Random Tournament
model. Likewise, setting Pr(b) <≈ 0.13 or Pr(b) >≈ 0.42 generates data which is
drawn from a different distribution than most real world datasets we survey. The tennis
data seems to be an outlier here, supporting a very low value of Pr(b), likely due to
Rafael Nadal, who has a winning lifetime record against all other players in the ATP
top 16 as of Feb. 1, 2014.
As we cannot reject all models given by CR outright we must look more closely at
the underlying distribution and attempt to fit the empirical data to a likely distribution.
For this we will dive more deeply into the 2014 Bundesliga League data, as the range
for Pr(b) is similar to the average of 0.153 < Pr(b) < 0.42 across all datasets and
the average upset probability for 2014 yields a model which is a good match for the
underlying data. The 2014 Bundesliga data has an average upset probability of Pr(b=
0.374) and a best fit probability according to the KS test of Pr(b= 0.30).
We must first identify what kind of probability distribution the samples are drawn
from in order to tell if they are the same or different. At first glance, the winning prob-
abilities appear to be drawn from a power law or some other heavy tailed distribution
distribution such as a log-normal [32, 8, 25]. The study of heavy tailed distributions in
empirical data is a rich topic that touches a number of disciplines including physics,
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Data Min Pr(b) Max Pr(b) Average Upset Probability
Bundesliga 2009 0.13 0.47 0.38433
Bundesliga 2010 0.15 0.45 0.39714
Bundesliga 2011 0.21 0.45 0.41114
Bundesliga 2012 0.20 0.42 0.38266
Bundesliga 2013 0.12 0.43 0.37767
Bundesliga 2014 0.15 0.39 0.37401
Premier 2009 0.12 0.43 0.34417
Premier 2010 0.14 0.37 0.33683
Premier 2011 0.17 0.44 0.41291
Premier 2012 0.15 0.39 0.39523
Premier 2013 0.16 0.41 0.40010
Premier 2014 0.13 0.39 0.33184
Tennis Top 16 0.04 0.35 0.29961
Table 3: Minimum and Maximum of the range of Pr(b) for which we can say that the
probability distribution of a team winning a knockout tournament according to the CR
model is drawn from the same distribution as the respective real world dataset (KS test,
p= 0.05). We also provide average upset (Pr(b)) probability for each datafile.
computer science, literature, transportation science, geology, biology as these distri-
butions describe a number of natural phenomena such as the spread of diseases, the
association of nodes in scale free networks, the connections of neurons in the brain,
the distribution of wealth amongst citizens, city sizes, and other interesting phenomena
[1, 8, 25]. Recently, more sophisticated methods of determining if an empirical distri-
bution follows a particular heavy tailed distribution have been developed, consequently
showing strong evidence that distributions once thought power laws (e.g., node connec-
tions on the internet and wealth distribution) are likely not explained by a power law
distribution [8] but rather by log-normal distributions [25]. The current standard for fit-
ting heavy tailed distributions in physics and other fields (and the one we will employ)
involves the use of robust statistical packages to estimate the fitting parameters then
testing the fitted model for basic plausibility through the use of a likelihood ratio test
[1]. This process will help us decide which distribution is the strongest fit for our data
as well as provide us with the actual fitting parameters to compare the real world and
generated data.
Figure 1 (B) shows the results of fitting the 2014 Bundesliga League data to a power
law for a random variable X of the form Pr(X ≥ x) ∝ cx−α as well as the fit for a log-
normal distribution Pr(X ≥ x) ∝ ∆(µ,σ) with median µ and multiplicative standard
deviation σ . Using a likelihood ratio test we find that the log-normal is a significantly
better fit for the data than the power law distribution (R = 0.7319, p = 0.4642). This
makes intuitive sense in this context as each matchup can be seen as a (somewhat)
independent random variable, and the product of multiple positive random variables
gives a log-normal distribution [25]. The fit parameters for the 2014 Bundesliga League
data are σ = 1.2611 and µ =−4.0717 while for the best fitting CR model with Pr(b=
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Figure 1: (A) Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the probability of a team win-
ning a tournament of the 2014 Bundesliga League data along with several random
benchmarks. Average is the value of Pr(b) computed as the average in the dataset
while Best is the value of Pr(b) tested (in 0.01 increments) which minimizing the KS
distance. (B) Comparison of fitted probability distributions for the 2014 Bundesliga
League data. The Log-Normal distribution is the best fit according to the likelihood
ratio test.
0.30) is σ = 1.0018 and µ = −3.3823. While those two distributions are similar, it
implies that perhaps a more nuanced, multi-parameter model is needed to capture the
matchup probabilities for tournaments.
5. Discussion and Future Directions
In order to transform into a more impactful area we must demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of our methods in real settings, and let these real settings drive our research.
Kagel and Roth [21] describe the journey for experimental economics: evolving from
theory to simulated or repurposed data to full fledged laboratory and field experiments.
This progression enabled a “conversation” between the experimentalists and the the-
oreticians which enabled the field to expand, evolve, and have the impact that it does
today in a variety of contexts.
Our case study of tournaments shows that the need to verify our models with data
is an important and interesting future direction for ComSoc. Working to verify these
models can point the way to new domain restrictions or necessary model generaliza-
tions. There has been more data driven research, like the kind presented here, thanks
to PrefLib [30] and other initiatives, e.g., [17, 42] ; we hope this trend continues. This
research complements the existing research on axiomatic characterizations, worst case
complexity, and algorithmic considerations (see, e.g., [13, 40, 18]). While there are
8
some issues with using repurposed data and discarding context (see, e.g., the discussion
by John Langford of Microsoft Research about the UCI Machine Learning Research
Repository at http://hunch.net/?p=159) it is a start towards a more nuanced
discussion about mechanisms and preferences.
Results about preference or domain restrictions can lead to elegant algorithmic re-
sults, but these restrictions should be complemented by some evidence that the re-
strictions are applicable. For example, in the over 300 complete, strict order datasets
in PrefLib [30], none are single-peaked, a popular profile restriction in voting [16].
Untested normative or generative data models can sometimes lead us astray; if we use
self reported data from surveys, or hold out data which does not fit our preconceived
model, we may introduce bias and thus draw conclusions that are spurious [37, 34]. Our
study of tournaments makes unrealistic assumptions about model completion in order
to produce deterministic tournaments. However, even these simple rounding rules yield
instances that are much simpler than the worst case results would imply.
Perhaps one way forward for ComSoc is incorporating even more ideas from ex-
perimental economics [21] including the use of human subjects experiments on Me-
chanical Turk [28, 12] like those performed by, e.g., Mao and Suri [27] and Mao et al.
[26]. Work with human subjects can lead to a more refined view of strategic behavior
and inform more interesting and realistic models on which we can base good, tested
theory [43, 42].
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